## Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

### A New Conditional for Naive Truth Theory

Andrew Bacon

#### Abstract

In this paper a logic suitable for reasoning disquotationally about truth, $\mathsf{TJK}^{+}$, is presented and shown to have a standard model. This work improves on Hartry Field’s recent results establishing consistency and $\omega$-consistency of truth theories with strong conditional logics. A novel method utilizing the Banach fixed point theorem for contracting functions on complete metric spaces is invoked, and the resulting logic is shown to validate a number of principles which existing revision theoretic methods have so far failed to provide.

#### Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 54, Number 1 (2013), 87-104.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 14 December 2012

http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1355494525

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1215/00294527-1731407

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
06132727

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR3007964

#### Citation

Bacon, Andrew. A New Conditional for Naive Truth Theory. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (2013), no. 1, 87--104. doi:10.1215/00294527-1731407. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1355494525.

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