Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Justification by Infinite Loops

David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg


In an earlier paper we have shown that a proposition can have a well-defined probability value, even if its justification consists of an infinite linear chain. In the present paper we demonstrate that the same holds if the justification takes the form of a closed loop. Moreover, in the limit that the size of the loop tends to infinity, the probability value of the justified proposition is always well-defined, whereas this is not always so for the infinite linear chain. This suggests that infinitism sits more comfortably with a coherentist view of justification than with an approach in which justification is portrayed as a linear process.

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Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 51, Number 4 (2010), 407-416.

First available in Project Euclid: 29 September 2010

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Primary: 60A99: None of the above, but in this section

probabilistic justification coherentism infinitism


Atkinson, David; Peijnenburg, Jeanne. Justification by Infinite Loops. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 51 (2010), no. 4, 407--416. doi:10.1215/00294527-2010-025.

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