Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Past Probabilities

Sven Ove Hansson

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Abstract

The probability that a fair coin tossed yesterday landed heads is either 0 or 1, but the probability that it would land heads was 0.5. In order to account for the latter type of probabilities, past probabilities, a temporal restriction operator is introduced and axiomatically characterized. It is used to construct a representation of conditional past probabilities. The logic of past probabilities turns out to be strictly weaker than the logic of standard probabilities.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 51, Number 2 (2010), 207-223.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 11 June 2010

Permanent link to this document
http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1276284783

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1215/00294527-2010-013

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
05758438

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR2667933

Subjects
Primary: 60A99: None of the above, but in this section
Secondary: 03B44: Temporal logic

Keywords
past probability objective probability temporal restriction propensity chance

Citation

Hansson, Sven Ove. Past Probabilities. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (2010), no. 2, 207--223. doi:10.1215/00294527-2010-013. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1276284783.


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