Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference

Graham Priest


In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Given that sorites and self-referential paradoxes are of the same kind, they should have the same kind of solution. The rest of the paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to sorites paradoxes is like, connections with a dialetheic solution to the self-referential paradoxes, and related issues—especially so called "higher order" vagueness.

Article information

Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 51, Number 1 (2010), 69-84.

First available in Project Euclid: 4 May 2010

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Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)

Zentralblatt MATH identifier

Primary: 03B52: Fuzzy logic; logic of vagueness [See also 68T27, 68T37, 94D05] 03B53: Paraconsistent logics
Secondary: 03A05: Philosophical and critical {For philosophy of mathematics, see also 00A30}

sorites paradoxes vagueness paradoxes of self-reference inclosure schema paraconsistency extended paradoxes higher order vagueness


Priest, Graham. Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 51 (2010), no. 1, 69--84. doi:10.1215/00294527-2010-005.

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