Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Reply to Robert Koons

Nuel Belnap and Anil Gupta

Abstract

Professor Robert Koons provides a welcome guide to our book The Revision Theory of Truth, and he puts forward objections that deserve serious consideration. In this note we shall respond to his principal objection. This objection calls into question our main thesis. As we argue, however, the objection is not successful. We should forewarn the reader that this note is not self-contained. It presupposes familiarity with The Revision Theory of Truth (primarily, Chapter 4) and with the review.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 35, Number 4 (1994), 632-636.

Dates
First available: 20 December 2002

Permanent link to this document
http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1040408617

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040408617

Subjects
Primary: 03B45: Modal logic (including the logic of norms) {For knowledge and belief, see 03B42; for temporal logic, see 03B44; for provability logic, see also 03F45}
Secondary: 03B25: Decidability of theories and sets of sentences [See also 11U05, 12L05, 20F10]

Citation

Gupta, Anil; Belnap, Nuel. Reply to Robert Koons. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1994), no. 4, 632--636. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040408617. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1040408617.


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References

  • [1] Gupta, A., ``A critique of deflationism," Philosophical Topics, vol. 21 (1993), pp. 57--81.
  • [2] Gupta, A., and N. Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993.
  • [3] Koons, R., Book Review, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 35 (1994), pp. 606--631.