Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Rethinking Quine's Argument on the Collapse of Modal Distinctions

Genoveva Martí

Abstract

This paper examines and discusses an argument for the collapse of modal distincions offered by Quine in "Reference and Modality" and in Word and Object that relies exclusively on a version of the Principle of Substitution. It is argued that the argument does not affect its historical targets: Carnap's treatment of modality, presented in Meaning and Necessity, and Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation, developed by Kaplan; nor does it affect a treatment of modality inspired in Frege's treatment of oblique contexts. It is argued, nevertheless, that the immunity of those systems to Quine's argument depends on the success of their rejection of the Principle of Substitution presupposed by Quine.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 38, Number 2 (1997), 276-294.

Dates
First available: 12 December 2002

Permanent link to this document
http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039724891

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR1489414

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039724891

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0898.03003

Subjects
Primary: 03B45: Modal logic (including the logic of norms) {For knowledge and belief, see 03B42; for temporal logic, see 03B44; for provability logic, see also 03F45}

Citation

Martí, Genoveva. Rethinking Quine's Argument on the Collapse of Modal Distinctions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (1997), no. 2, 276--294. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039724891. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039724891.


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