Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
- Notre Dame J. Formal Logic
- Volume 38, Number 4 (1997), 488-515.
Information and Impossibilities
Abstract
In this paper I explore informationalism, a pragmatic theory of modality that seems to solve some serious problems in the familiar possible worlds accounts of modality. I view the theory as an elaboration of Stalnaker's moderate modal realism, though it also derives from Dretske's semantic theory of information. Informationalism is presented in Section 2 after the prerequisite stage setting in Section 1. Some applications are sketched in Section 3. Finally, a mathematical model of the theory is developed in Section 4.
How many times have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth? (Arthur Conan Doyle)
You've put me in an impossible situation. (Anonymous)
[N]othing we imagine is absolutely impossible. (David Hume)
Article information
Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 38, Number 4 (1997), 488-515.
Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 10 December 2002
Permanent link to this document
http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039540766
Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039540766
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR1648849
Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0920.03002
Subjects
Primary: 03A05: Philosophical and critical {For philosophy of mathematics, see also 00A30}
Secondary: 03B45: Modal logic (including the logic of norms) {For knowledge and belief, see 03B42; for temporal logic, see 03B44; for provability logic, see also 03F45}
Citation
Barwise, Jon. Information and Impossibilities. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38 (1997), no. 4, 488--515. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039540766. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039540766.


