Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Irrevocable Belief Revision in Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Krister Segerberg

Abstract

In this paper we present a new modeling for belief revision that is what we term irrevocable. This modeling is of philosophical interest since it captures some features of suppositional reasoning, and of formal interest since it is closely connected with AGM, yet provides for iterated belief revision. The analysis is couched in terms of dynamic doxastic logic.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 39, Number 3 (1998), 287-306.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 6 December 2002

Permanent link to this document
http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039182247

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR1741539

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039182247

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0972.03015

Subjects
Primary: 03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)
Secondary: 03B60: Other nonclassical logic 68T27: Logic in artificial intelligence

Citation

Segerberg, Krister. Irrevocable Belief Revision in Dynamic Doxastic Logic. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 39 (1998), no. 3, 287--306. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039182247. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039182247.


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References

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