

A NOTE ON CONSTRUCTIBLE SETS OF INTEGERS

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Is there always a constructible¹ set of integers of order $\alpha + 1$ which is not of order α , when α is less than ω_1 ?² I shall answer this question in the negative. It is clear that there is always a constructible set of order $\alpha + 1$ which is not of order α ; for M_α itself (the set of *all* sets of order α) is a member of $M_{\alpha+1}$, and certainly not a member of itself by the axiom of foundation. But there is not always a set of *integers* in $M_{\alpha+1}$ which is not already in M_α . In fact, I shall show that it can happen that "for a long time" (a Δ_2^1 ordinal) we get no new sets of integers in the hierarchy of constructible sets, and then "pop!" a new set of integers appears.

The methods used in this paper are new, and not due to me but to Paul Cohen, who has used them to show³ that there is an $\alpha < \omega_1$ such that $\langle M_\alpha, \varepsilon \rangle$ is a *model for von Neumann-Bernays set theory* (VB), if there is any well-founded model⁴ for that theory at all. I am indebted to Georg Kreisel for calling my attention to this method.

THEOREM 1. *There is an ordinal α less than constructible ω_1 such that there is no set of integers in $M_{\alpha+1} - M_\alpha$.*

Proof: Let T be the set of sentences of set theory which are true in the model $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{L}$ (i.e., in the model $\langle \mathbf{L}, \varepsilon \rangle$). By the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem there is a countable model $\langle M_1, \varepsilon \rangle$ such that $\langle \mathbf{L}, \varepsilon \rangle$ is an extension of $\langle M_1, \varepsilon \rangle$ and such that the same sentences T are true in $\langle M_1, \varepsilon \rangle$ as in $\langle \mathbf{L}, \varepsilon \rangle$. We call a model $\langle M, \varepsilon \rangle$ *transitive* if $x \varepsilon M, y \varepsilon x \Rightarrow y \varepsilon M$. It is easily proved (by induction on the order of the elements of M) that if $\langle M, \varepsilon \rangle$ is a submodel of $\langle \mathbf{L}, \varepsilon \rangle$ then $\langle M, \varepsilon \rangle$ is isomorphic to a transitive model. So we may assume $\langle M_1, \varepsilon \rangle$ is transitive.

Now certain formulas $F(x)$ are *invariant* relative to the class of transitive models. By an $F(x)$ being *invariant* we mean that if α satisfies $F(x)$ in a transitive model $\langle M, \varepsilon \rangle$ then α satisfies $F(x)$ in *every* transitive model in which the set α occurs. For example, "x is an ordinal" (the formula is $F(x) = \text{trans}(x) \ \& \ (y)(z)(y \varepsilon x \ \& \ z \varepsilon x \ \& \ y \neq z \Rightarrow y \varepsilon z \vee z \varepsilon y)$ where $\text{trans}(x)$ is short for $(y)(z)(z \varepsilon x \ \& \ y \varepsilon z \Rightarrow y \varepsilon x)$) is easily seen to be invariant relative to the class of transitive models, and so are "x is the ordinal ω ", "x

is a finite ordinal", "x is the set M_α for some ordinal α " and many other notions. Since the proof that Gödel gave in [G] of the "absoluteness" of these notions in fact shows invariance, I omit details.

The sentence "there is an ordinal α such that there is no set of integers in $M_{\alpha+1} - M_\alpha$ " is true in $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$ since there is no set of integers in M_α when $\alpha \geq$ classical ω_1 which is not already in M_{ω_1} , by theorem 2 of [G*]. So there is no set of integers in $M_{\omega_1+1} - M_{\omega_1}$, for example. But the same sentences T are true in $\langle M_1, \varepsilon \rangle$ as in $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$. Hence, "there is an ordinal α such that $M_{\alpha+1} - M_\alpha$ contains no set of integers (finite ordinals)" is true in $\langle M_1, \varepsilon \rangle$. Since this sentence contains only invariant notions, there is indeed an ordinal $\alpha \in M_1$ such that $M_{\alpha+1} - M_\alpha$ contains no set of integers. Since M_1 is countable, every ordinal in M_1 is countable, and we have thus proved that there is an $\alpha <$ classical ω_1 such that $M_{\alpha+1} - M_\alpha$ contains no set of integers.

But in fact we have proved more. For essentially the preceding argument can be formalized in VB. Of course, we cannot construct a model for *all* of VB in VB and also prove that it is a model; but we can construct the structure⁵ $\langle M_{\omega_1+2}, \varepsilon \rangle$ in VB and define the set T of sentences true in this structure. Since we never *employed* the fact that $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$ is a model for VB in the argument, but only the fact that the sentence "there is an ordinal α such that there is no set of integers in $M_{\alpha+2} - M_\alpha$ " is true in $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$, this structure suffices.

Since all theorems of VB are true in $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$, the theorem "there is a countable α such that $M_{\alpha+1} - M_\alpha$ contains no set of integers", which we have just proved, is also true in $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$. Hence there is such an α which is "countable" even on the interpretation of "countable" afforded by $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$; i.e., $\alpha <$ constructible ω_1 . q.e.d.

Let us call an ordinal α invariant whenever there exists an invariant formula $F(x)$ which is satisfied only by α . It is easily proved (by considering countable models) that no ordinal $\geq \omega_1$ can be invariant. In fact, the invariant ordinals are just the Δ^1_2 ordinals⁶ by an argument of Mostowski.⁷ These are smaller⁸ than constructible ω_1 , but still quite "large"; for example, all the ordinals for which there are names in the Church-Kleene system of notations (cf. [C], [CK]), are only a segment of the Δ^1_2 ordinals. Thus there is some possible interest in the following theorem, which says that there are stretches of length β , for every invariant β , in which we get no "new" sets of integers in the hierarchy of constructible sets of order $< \omega_1$.

THEOREM 2. *If β is an invariant ordinal, then there is an $\alpha <$ constructible ω_1 such that there is no set of integers in $M_{\alpha+\gamma} - M_\alpha$ for any $\gamma \leq \beta$.*

Proof: Exactly like the proof of theorem 1, using $\alpha + \beta$ in place of $\alpha + 1$ throughout. Since the M_α are a chain $M_0 \subset M_1 \subset M_2 \subset \dots$, if there is no set of integers in $M_{\alpha+\beta} - M_\alpha$, then neither is there a set of integers in $M_{\alpha+\gamma} - M_\alpha$ for any $\gamma < \beta$.

NOTES

1. The term is used throughout in the sense of [G*]. See also [G] for a more detailed exposition.
2. Here ω_1 means the least ordinal in the constructible third number class (i.e., the ω_1 of Gödel's model $V=L$) unless the expression "classical ω_1 " is used. When I wish to remind the reader that this is how " ω_1 " is used, I also write "constructible ω_1 ".
3. In [PC], which is unfortunately not published.
4. A model $\langle M, R \rangle$ for set theory is an ordered pair consisting of a set of entities M and a two place predicate R defined (at least) on M such that the axioms of set theory are satisfied by the interpretation: "set" means *member of M* , and " ε " means R . If there are no infinite-descending ε -chains, i.e., no chains a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots such that $a_2 R a_1, a_3 R a_2, \dots$ the model is said to be *well-founded*.
5. By a *structure* I mean simply an ordered pair $\langle C, R \rangle$ such that C is a set and R is a diadic relation on C . The invariance of all the notions needed holds in the structure $\langle M_{\omega_1+2}, \varepsilon \rangle$ as well as in $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$.
6. A predicate $R(x, y)$ of integers is called "expressible in both two function-quantifier forms" if the predicate $R(x, y)$ is definable in second order number theory using just two second order quantifiers (and arbitrary first order quantifiers, i.e., quantifiers over numbers, since these can always be reduced to one when function quantifiers are present, by known tricks), which can be brought out in the order EA, and also definable (not necessarily by the same formula, but also using just two second order quantifiers) in such a way that the second order quantifiers can be brought out in the order AE. These predicates form a family referred to in the literature as $\Sigma_2^1 \cap \Pi_2^1$, or simply as Δ_2^1 . This family is closely connected with well-founded models; in fact, a predicate of integers has the same extension in all well-founded models of some system of set theory if and only if it is in Δ_2^1 . I use the term " Δ_2^1 ordinal" to mean *ordinal of some well ordering $R(x, y)$ of integers such that the predicate $R \varepsilon \Delta_2^1$* .
7. Cf. [M]. Mostowski's argument was given for β -models of analysis but is easily extended to well-founded models of set theory.
8. Shoenfield has shown in [S] that all two function-quantifier notions are "absolute" in Gödel's sense. Since it is a theorem that there are only countably many Δ_2^1 ordinals, they are all $<$ classical ω_1 . The theorem must hold in all models, in particular in $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$, so all the Δ_2^1 ordinals are less than *constructible* ω_1 . Since by the result of Shoenfield just mentioned, the Δ_2^1 predicates of the model $\langle L, \varepsilon \rangle$ are provably the same as those of $\langle V, \varepsilon \rangle$, it follows that all Δ_2^1 ordinals (and even all EA ordinals and all AE ordinals) are less than *constructible* ω_1 .

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