### A New Conditional for Naive Truth Theory

Andrew Bacon
Source: Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 54, Number 1 (2013), 87-104.

#### Abstract

In this paper a logic suitable for reasoning disquotationally about truth, $\mathsf{TJK}^{+}$, is presented and shown to have a standard model. This work improves on Hartry Field’s recent results establishing consistency and $\omega$-consistency of truth theories with strong conditional logics. A novel method utilizing the Banach fixed point theorem for contracting functions on complete metric spaces is invoked, and the resulting logic is shown to validate a number of principles which existing revision theoretic methods have so far failed to provide.

First Page:
Primary Subjects: 03B20
Secondary Subjects: 03B50, 03B47, 03Axx
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Permanent link to this document: http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1355494525
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1215/00294527-1731407
Zentralblatt MATH identifier: 06132727
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet): MR3007964

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Project Euclid: euclid.ndjfl/1093870447
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