Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference
Graham Priest
Source: Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 51, Number 1
(2010), 69-84.
Abstract
In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Given that sorites and self-referential paradoxes are of the same kind, they should have the same kind of solution. The rest of the paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to sorites paradoxes is like, connections with a dialetheic solution to the self-referential paradoxes, and related issues—especially so called "higher order" vagueness.
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Keywords: sorites paradoxes; vagueness; paradoxes of self-reference; inclosure schema; paraconsistency; extended paradoxes; higher order vagueness
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Links and Identifiers
Permanent link to this document: http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1273002110
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1215/00294527-2010-005
Zentralblatt MATH identifier: 05720470
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet): MR2666570
References
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