Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in
degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In
this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on
infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist
stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs
into difficulties.
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