Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach
Daniel Nolan
Source: Notre Dame J. Formal Logic Volume 38, Number 4 (1997), 535-572.
Abstract
Reasoning about situations we take to be impossible is useful for a variety of theoretical purposes. Furthermore, using a device of impossible worlds when reasoning about the impossible is useful in the same sorts of ways that the device of possible worlds is useful when reasoning about the possible. This paper discusses some of the uses of impossible worlds and argues that commitment to them can and should be had without great metaphysical or logical cost. The paper then provides an account of reasoning with impossible worlds, by treating such reasoning as reasoning employing counterpossible conditionals, and provides a semantics for the proposed treatment.
Primary Subjects: 03A05
Secondary Subjects: 03B45, 03B53
Full-text: Open access
Links and Identifiers
Permanent link to this document: http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039540769
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet):
MR1648852
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039540769
Zentralblatt MATH identifier:
0916.03013
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