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Equilibrium selection and the restricted game

John C. Harsanyi
Source: Duke Math. J. Volume 81, Number 2 (1996), 251-254.
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Primary Subjects: 90D10
Secondary Subjects: 90D20
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Links and Identifiers

Permanent link to this document: http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.dmj/1077245669
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet): MR1395404
Zentralblatt MATH identifier: 0873.90118
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1215/S0012-7094-96-08113-2

References

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Mathematical Reviews (MathSciNet): MR88a:90005
Zentralblatt MATH: 0633.90094
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.2307/1911154
[A2] R. J. Aumann, Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibria, Discussion Paper # 57, Center for Rationality, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1994, to appear in Econometrica.
[A3] R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies, J. Math. Econom. 1 (1974), no. 1, 67–96.
Mathematical Reviews (MathSciNet): MR54:9690
Zentralblatt MATH: 0297.90106
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
[DF] E. Dekel and D. Fudenberg, Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty, J. Econom. Theory 52 (1990), no. 2, 243–267.
Mathematical Reviews (MathSciNet): MR91m:90213
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Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90033-G
[KS] E. Kalai and D. Samet, Persistent equilibria in strategic games, Internat. J. Game Theory 13 (1984), no. 3, 129–144.
Mathematical Reviews (MathSciNet): MR86d:90171
Zentralblatt MATH: 0541.90097
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1007/BF01769811
[M] R. B. Myerson, Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept, Internat. J. Game Theory 7 (1978), no. 2, 73–80.
Mathematical Reviews (MathSciNet): MR80a:90165
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Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1007/BF01753236
[N1] J. F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium points in $n$-person games, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 36 (1950), 48–49.
Mathematical Reviews (MathSciNet): MR11,192c
Zentralblatt MATH: 0036.01104
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
[N2] J. F. Nash, Jr., Non-cooperative games, Ann. of Math. (2) 54 (1951), 286–295.
Mathematical Reviews (MathSciNet): MR13,261g
Zentralblatt MATH: 0045.08202
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.2307/1969529
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