An early paper on the refinement of Nash equilibrium
Roger Myerson
Source: Duke Math. J. Volume 81, Number 1 (1995), 67-75.
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Permanent link to this document: http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.dmj/1077245462
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet):
MR1381971
Zentralblatt MATH identifier:
0944.91004
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1215/S0012-7094-95-08107-1
Euclid Identifier: euclid.dmj/1077245462
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