Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
William F. Lucas
Source: Duke Math. J. Volume 81, Number 1
(1995), 55-65.
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Permanent link to this document: http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.dmj/1077245461
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet): MR1381970
Zentralblatt MATH identifier: 0849.90135
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1215/S0012-7094-95-08106-X
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