Kuhn , Harsanyi , Selten , Weibull , van Damme , Nash, Jr. , Hammerstein : The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory: Nobel Seminar, 8 December 1994

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The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory: Nobel Seminar, 8 December 1994

Harold W. Kuhn, John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten, Jörgen W. Weibull, Eric van Damme, John F. Nash, Jr., and Peter Hammerstein

Source: Duke Math. J. Volume 81, Number 1 (1995), 1-29.

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Primary Subjects: 90-03

Secondary Subjects: 01A70, 90Dxx

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Permanent link to this document: http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.dmj/1077245457
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet): MR1381966
Zentralblatt MATH identifier: 0849.01037
Digital Object Identifier: doi:10.1215/S0012-7094-95-08102-2

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