The Annals of Statistics

Agreeing to Disagree

Robert J. Aumann

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Abstract

Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event $E$ if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event $A$ are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.

Article information

Source
Ann. Statist. Volume 4, Number 6 (1976), 1236-1239.

Dates
First available: 12 April 2007

Permanent link to this document
http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176343654

JSTOR
links.jstor.org

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR433654

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0379.62003

Subjects
Primary: 62A15
Secondary: 62C05: General considerations 90A05 90D35

Keywords
Information subjective probability posterior statistics game theory revising probabilities concensus Harsanyi doctrine

Citation

Aumann, Robert J. Agreeing to Disagree. The Annals of Statistics 4 (1976), no. 6, 1236--1239. doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176343654.


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