## The Annals of Statistics

- Ann. Statist.
- Volume 4, Number 6 (1976), 1023-1295

### Agreeing to Disagree

#### Abstract

Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event $E$ if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event $A$ are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.

#### Article information

**Source**

Ann. Statist. Volume 4, Number 6 (1976), 1236-1239.

**Dates**

First available: 12 April 2007

**Permanent link to this document**

http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176343654

**JSTOR**

links.jstor.org

**Digital Object Identifier**

doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654

**Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)**

MR433654

**Zentralblatt MATH identifier**

0379.62003

**Subjects**

Primary: 62A15

Secondary: 62C05: General considerations 90A05 90D35

**Keywords**

Information subjective probability posterior statistics game theory revising probabilities concensus Harsanyi doctrine

#### Citation

Aumann, Robert J. Agreeing to Disagree. The Annals of Statistics 4 (1976), no. 6, 1236--1239. doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176343654.